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Globalization has motivated firms to expand into foreign markets, but internationaliza-
tion is inherently dynamic. Many firms have exited foreign markets for various reasons,
but some later decide to re-enter those same markets. Based on a case study of a Brazil-
ian multinational’s activities inMexico, this study contributes to the literature on re-entry
decisions of multinational enterprises and their outcomes, focusing on the roles of insti-
tutional voids and the experiences of decision-makers during such processes. The findings
suggest that companies learn from their mistakes and reconsider how they approach re-
entry and the resources that may need to be mobilized. However, the learning process is
not straightforward as it is clouded by international knowledge myopia. This study high-
lights how multiple actors and considerations influence re-entry events.
Introduction
As competition in world markets has intensified,
an increasing number of firms have faced exit and
re-entry decisions. However, little systematic anal-
ysis has been done on the drivers and the outcomes
of re-entry. The few studies that have examined re-
entry decisions have mainly relied on secondary
data (Bernini, Du and Love, 2016; Chen, Sousa
and He, 2019; Javalgi et al., 2011; Surdu, Mellahi
and Glaister, 2019). This has prompted calls for
researchers to conduct ‘exploratory detailed case
analyses with a longitudinal perspective’ (Welch
andWelch, 2009, p. 575) to develop a better under-
standing of complex exit and re-entry processes.
Research on entry and exit modes acknowl-
edges the importance of the institutional context
and how it influences a firm’s strategic decisions
We thank the Editor, Douglas Cumming, and the three
anonymous reviewers for their insights and support dur-
ing the review process. Durham University provided sup-
port for data collection. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the 2018Academy of International Busi-
ness Conference in Minneapolis, MN.
(Meschi, Phanand and Wassmer, 2016; Peng,
Wang and Jiang, 2008). However, studies tend
to focus on how firms from developed coun-
tries enter/exit emerging markets or how firms
from emerging markets enter/exit more developed
markets (Getachew and Beamish, 2017; Wu and
Chen, 2014). Little is known about what drives
emerging market firms to enter, exit and re-enter
another emerging market and the role played by
institutional voids in the process.
Moreover, there are conflicting views on how the
stock of knowledge from prior entries affects re-
entry. Some studies suggest that firms learn from
failures (Madsen and Desai, 2010; Tan and Sousa,
2019), while others suggest that firms may fail
to learn from previous experiences (Cannon and
Edmondson, 2005; He et al., 2018). The learn-
ing literature has identified failure as an impor-
tant driver in the development of knowledge, skills
and capabilities that are valuable in subsequent
activities (Cope, 2011; McGrath, 1999). However,
there is increasing recognition that failure may not
lead to learning. Managers can be overconfident
in their abilities and knowledge, developing hubris
that prevents them from learning from failure.
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Our detailed study examines re-entry decisions
and the process, focusing on the case of a large
multinational enterprise (MNE) headquartered in
Brazil and its re-entry into Mexico. In this study,
the re-entry process is considered to be a learning
experience (Bernini, Du and Love, 2016; Javalgi
et al., 2011) by focusing on a company that failed
in its initial attempt and subsequently re-entered
the previously abandoned market. Specifically, we
consider how the initial failure influenced the com-
pany’s learning and its re-entry decision. We also
investigate the drivers that affect the re-entry pro-
cess and how they relate to learning. Finally, we
explore the outcomes of the re-entry process and
how accumulated experiences shape a company’s
decisions through that process.
This study makes the following contributions.
Firstly, focusing on an under-explored phe-
nomenon and using a case study approach, it
provides further understanding of the complex
dynamics underpinning re-entry actions. Study-
ing this complex event over time contributes to
a better understanding of re-entry and should
be of great interest to academics, managers and
policy-makers alike. Secondly, by focusing on an
emerging market firm entering another emerging
market sharing similar institutional voids, the
study sheds light on the role played by institu-
tional voids in shaping the re-entry decision and
its outcomes. Thirdly, the study clarifies the role
of knowledge as it accrues after entry. Specifically,
it demonstrates that the knowledge MNEs accu-
mulate during their initial operations (i.e. after the
first entry) in a market neither secures a successful
re-entry nor necessarily enables them to operate
alone in the foreign market. Instead, it may lead
to international knowledge myopia that refers to
individuals’ overconfidence in their knowledge
and the underestimation of differences that exist
across markets and circumstances, leading to a
lack of motivation to search for and develop new
knowledge and resulting in erroneous decisions
and limited learning.
Research on re-entry
Re-internationalization describes the process of a
firm exiting from an international operation, re-
maining outside that particular market for some
time and then subsequently re-entering the mar-
ket (Welch and Welch, 2009). Although there are
many judicious reasons for a firm’s exit (Belderbos
and Zou, 2006; Benito, 1997, 2005; Berry, 2013;
Sousa andTan, 2020), permanent withdrawal from
a foreign market is not always the best strategy
(Javalgi et al., 2011), since the situation in the
market and/or the situation within the firm may
change. However, a firm’s re-entry decision is a
complex and dynamic process that depends on a
variety of factors, both internal and external.
Internal factors consist of the characteristics of
firms, their owners and their managers, and play
significant roles in decisions to re-enter a foreign
market. A firm re-entering a foreign market is in
a different position than in its first entry. It will
have accumulated experiences across a range of
business activities while operating in that market,
as well as having developed various relationships
with local partners (Chen, Sousa and He, 2019;
Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). Such experiential
knowledge and networks with customers and sup-
pliers in the foreign market might well aid re-entry
– even if firms withdraw from a foreign market,
they could maintain these networks. Thus, the ex-
tent to which a firm successfully develops these
networks can facilitate future re-entry by helping
companies to better relate with local partners and
customers (Yayla et al., 2018) and provide op-
portunities due to the institutional and cultural
knowledge acquired by operating in a host coun-
try (Javalgi et al., 2011).
This is consistent with the view that when a firm
exits a foreign market, it retains a stock of knowl-
edge, or ‘heritage’, that facilitates subsequent re-
entry (Welch and Welch, 2009). This stock of
knowledge about the foreign market lessens uncer-
tainty on the re-entry and helps firms reduce their
sunk costs associated with re-entry (Bernini, Du
and Love, 2016). Recognition of the potential use-
fulness of experiences and relationships previously
formed in a foreign market might generate greater
confidence and interest in re-entry. Having knowl-
edge of the previously exited market, firms are
more likely to return to that market with greater
scope (Javalgi et al., 2011).
Even negative experiences can be useful, since
they can help a firm avoid repeating mistakes
during re-entry. Experiencing failure can thus be
viewed as a form of ‘survival-enhancing learning’
(Baum and Ingram, 1998) and an essential pre-
requisite for adaptation and systemic resilience
(Sitkin, 1992). Indeed, the re-entry process can be
a way for a firm to learn from failure. Learning
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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from failures may be more valuable than learning
from success, since costly lessons make managers
more conscious of the factors inhibiting success.
Failure can motivate the initiation of formal
and informal learning processes, thereby helping
managers identify and highlight mistakes made in
strategic decisions (Tsinopoulos, Yan and Sousa,
2019). This helps firms avoid the same practices
and experiment with alternative actions, routines
and strategies that may increase the probability
of subsequent success (Madsen and Desai, 2010).
The re-entry decision, therefore, is shaped by
experiences prior to and during the exit decision
(Bernini, Du and Love, 2016; Surdu, Mellahi and
Glaister, 2019) and can play a significant role in
re-entry decisions and subsequent outcomes.
Managers’ perceptions are also important
in the re-entry process (Vissak and Francioni,
2013). Emerging market firms’ strategies are
not only influenced by actual firm experiences
but also by managers’ perceptions of these ex-
periences (Thomas et al., 2007). For instance,
if managers have positive perceptions and be-
lieve they have accumulated enough knowl-
edge, they may re-enter a market prematurely,
which may force them out of the market for
the second time. Similarly, scholars generally
agree that business failure is an emotionally
charged experience (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd,
Covin and Kuratko, 2009) and could result in
strong negative emotions that leave little capacity
for learning through collecting and processing of
failure-related information (He et al., 2018).
Moreover, overconfidentmanagers tend to focus
on successes and overlook failures, thereby exag-
gerating the likelihood of success (Levinthal and
March, 1993). According to the organizational
learning literature, learning takes place if there is
a perceived knowledge gap and motivation to ac-
quire new knowledge (Duncan and Weiss, 1979;
Fiol and Lyles, 1985). If managers are overconfi-
dent in their knowledge, they may ignore knowl-
edge gaps and lack motivation to acquire new
knowledge. Similarly, Levinthal andMarch (1993)
pointed out that managers often underestimate
differences across time and space, leading them to
believe the similarities are greater than they actu-
ally are and resulting in erroneous decisions and
limited learning. Such attitudes can trap their com-
petencies, leading to myopia (Schulz, 2002) and
an ensuing market exit. Knowledge myopia (i.e.
overconfidence in capabilities and knowledge) is
a learning dysfunction (Argyris and Schon, 1978;
Levitt andMarch, 1988) that constrains the recog-
nition of relevant alternatives and hinders the abil-
ity to learn from failures. However, despite its sig-
nificance, there has been little systematic analysis
of the influence of managerial attitudes and per-
ceptions on re-entry decisions.
External factors, such as political, economic and
cultural conditions, are factors also expected to
influence the likelihood of re-entry. Their impacts
on, inter alia, market demand and the competitive
environment, and therefore the attractiveness of a
market, are important in the decision to re-engage
with the foreign market (Figueira-de-Lemos and
Hadjikhani, 2014; Surdu, Mellahi and Glaister,
2019). Likewise, infrastructure and the capacity
and organization of distribution have cost im-
plications that a company must consider when
re-entering a previously abandoned market. The
lack of reliable financial intermediate agencies,
deficient financial market disclosure and weak
corporate governance are also external factors
potentially affecting a firm’s re-entry decision.
Additionally, the lack of regulations lowers trust
in institutions and in their capacity to protect
foreign investments (Hotho, 2014), which can have
impacts on re-entry decisions. In the absence of
clear regulations, companies need to learn how
to conduct business in an environment where
institutions fail to enforce regulations. This may
affect the organizational decisions a firm makes
to shield itself from the institutional environment
(Carney and Farashahi, 2005) as well as re-entry
outcomes. For instance, in countries character-
ized by high institutional risks, firms may opt to
join local partners (Beamish and Lupton, 2009)
through strategic alliances or joint ventures (JV).
Such alliances provide foreign companies with
local institutional knowledge and access to criti-
cal resources (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997), while
learning to circumvent institutional voids.
The study
The research context
Brazil and Mexico are the largest economies in
Latin America, have the largest numbers of indige-
nous MNEs (Global Fortune, 2017) and provide a
pertinent research context as home and host coun-
tries due to their shared characteristics as emerg-
ing markets (Schneider, 2009). The countries’
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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emerging economy status is well suited to shed
light on the main research phenomena of this
study:1 the drivers and outcomes of a re-entry
decision; the influence of institutional factors and
the impact of learning in this context. Emerging
economies are hampered by institutional dysfunc-
tions such as lax regulatory systems, weak judicial
systems, corruption and generally low levels of
trust in public institutions (Khanna and Palepu,
1997) that add further complexity to the re-entry
process.
Given the significant gap in the re-entry litera-
ture on specifically how companies from emerg-
ing economies re-enter other emerging markets,
and the outcomes of re-entry, an exploratory case
study is well justified. In this respect, Flyvbjerg
(2004) argued that a case study is more construc-
tive if it considers atypical cases. Examining an
under-explored topic through a case study illus-
trates an unusual phenomenon and extends rela-
tionships that would be difficult to observe oth-
erwise (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Our case
has some distinct characteristics. First, market dy-
namics observed in emerging markets differ from
those in developed countries mostly due to a lack
of institutional dependability and transparency.
Second, the selected case company stayed out of
the market for less than 2 years, which is a rela-
tively short period between exit and re-entry. Thus,
our study covers a fairly continuous process, al-
beit one with various ‘twists and turns’ rather than
discrete events that are only distantly associated
through a common focal company and host mar-
ket. Third, the company re-entered the Mexican
market through a wholly owned brownfield estab-
lishment but chose later to change it to an inter-
national joint venture (IJV). This adds an addi-
tional dimension of not only re-entering a market,
but also re-considering the way of operating there.
1Nevertheless, most Brazilian companies lag behind their
counterparts in developed countries in terms of assets
and face restraints in capital access such as long-term
credit. Brazilian managers’ lack of international experi-
ence has fostered an aversion to risk-taking and reluc-
tance to operate in non-domestic environments (Rocha,
Carneiro and Silva, 2007). Mexico is the second most im-
portant economy in Latin America. While attractive as a
host country formanyMNEs due to its size and cost level,
it suffers from an underdeveloped business infrastructure
such as availability of distribution and financial interme-
diaries. Its reputation for corruption and weak enforce-
ment means trust in formal institutions is low (Hotho,
2014).
Combined, these characteristics mean the case can
provide valuable new insights on internationaliza-
tion dynamics (Benito, Petersen andWelch, 2012).
Case companies and key participants
In this paper, we refer to the focal case company as
Beta and the two other companies that also played
roles as Alpha and Omega.2 Beta is a family-
owned Brazilian coachbuilder established in 1949;
the founder’s family controls two-thirds of its eq-
uity capital.3 Its primary competitive advantage
lies in the customization of its products. The com-
pany refers to itself as a ‘builder of tailor-made
buses’. Its customization is possible due to a highly
vertically integrated production system that is un-
common among its competitors.4 Beta has grown
in the last 10 years through a series of IJVs in
various emerging markets, mostly initiated by cus-
tomers. Since buses are a primary form of mass
transportation in emerging economies, these coun-
tries represent significant market prospects.
The company began its internationalization pro-
cess in the 1960s through exports to Uruguay and
Paraguay. Beta first entered the relatively closed
Mexican market through a licensing agreement
with Alpha in the early 1990s.5 Figure 1 illus-
trates Beta’s internationalization history until its
IJVwithOmega inMexico, highlighting key events
for our study.
Alpha is a Mexican automobile company that
produces buses (including chassis) and trucks. In
1992, Alpha entered a US$90 million strategic al-
liance to sell buses using Beta’s technology. The
strategic alliance was designed to last 10 years and
included transfers of technology, engineering and
2Beta, Alpha and Omega are pseudonyms.
3Being family owned impacts how managers are selected
to fill various company positions at headquarters.
4Approximately 70% of the buses’ body parts are made
by the company and the rest are supplied by outside con-
tractors.
5Overall, Beta is representative of many BrazilianMNEs.
It is strongly embedded in its country-of-origin, especially
in terms of its managerial mindset and composition of its
board of directors. Core activities such as research and
development are mostly done at headquarters and much
of the production is still done in Brazil. Like the major-
ity of Brazilian companies, it is family owned. Beta’s in-
ternationalization path aligns with that typically taken by
Brazilian companies when they internationalize (Fleury
and Fleury, 2006), starting with non-equity operations in
neighbouring countries.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 1. Timeline of Beta’s internationalization process [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 1. Case companies
Alfa Beta Omega
Decade of establishment 1950s 1940s 1920s
Home country Mexico Brazil Germany
FDI operations 3 countries 9 countries Over 22 countries
Total employees 1,600 local employees 22,000, of which 50% in
foreign operations
200,000, of which 40% in
foreign operations
Board of directors Local Local International
Market Local 6% of the global market Varies internationally; from 7%
to 59%
Ownership Family-owned Family-owned Listed, mostly institutional
investors
production expertise and quality support. Beta
had no managerial involvement with Alpha and
the agreement was purely for the Mexican market.
Omega is a German automobile MNE, one of
the largest international companies in its indus-
try. It has five divisions: cars, trucks, buses, vans
and financial services. Omega entered Mexico in
the 1980s through a greenfield arrangement in the
truck segment (Miranda, 2007) and later expanded
to cars and buses. Omega suffered during theMex-
ican economic crisis and in 1997 stopped produc-
ing buses in Mexico but continued with its chassis
production. At the end of the 1990s, Omega was
looking for local bus partners for its chassis divi-
sion (Metro Magazine, 2002). Table 1 summarizes
the case companies.
Data collection and analysis
We collected data from three sources: in-depth,
semi-structured interviews, documentary sources
and direct observation. A total of 17 interviews
were conducted with 10 managers and former
managers in Brazil, and 7 at Beta’s subsidiary in
Mexico between October 2015 and May 2016. In-
terviewees were selected based on their presumed
information domains (Welch and Piekkari, 2017),
as we were seeking participants with know-how
about the company’s internationalization process
and expertise in Mexico.6 Table 2 summarizes the
interview information and provides the rationale
for the selection of each interviewee.
A primary challenge when researching disinvest-
ment and re-entry is the time frame of the phe-
nomenon, since the process tends to occur over
long periods. Interviews, therefore, had a retro-
spective characteristic. The semi-structured inter-
view protocol included questions focused on Beta’s
6One thing that has helped us deal with sensitive topics
is that one of our first interviewees was a former director
responsible for the internationalization of the company
to Mexico. His status as a former director allowed him
to be frank, equipping us with important information.
The background gained during that interview allowed
us to introduce and discuss sensitive issues with later
interviewees.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Overview of interviews
Interviewee Position
Duration
(min) Language Reason
Interviewee
1*
Shop floor
worker
65 Portuguese In charge of training workers in foreign
operations – limitations found in Mexican
workers. He has been working for the company
for over 20 years.
Interviewee
2*
Commercial
manager
41 Portuguese Responsible for the commercial department and
foreign operations. He has been working for
the company for over 20 years. Explained the
internationalization process.
Interviewee
3**
Former
director
221 Portuguese In charge of setting up the agreement with Alpha,
exiting the market and re-entering it. Found
the new partner. No longer involved with the
company, so less likely he would ‘portray a
particular image’ of himself or the
organization (Piekkari and Tietze, 2016,
p. 219). More than 40 years at Beta.
Interviewee
4*
Operations
director
61 Portuguese In charge of transferring policies and practices
from headquarters to subsidiaries. Explained
the internationalization process and
managerial attitudes towards it.
Interviewee
5*
Operations
manager
83 Portuguese One of the first expatriates in Mexico. In
addition, he had a view on the company as a
whole and the internationalization process.
Working for Beta for over 20 years.
Interviewee
6*
Engineering
director
59 Portuguese In charge of transferring policies and practices
from headquarters to subsidiaries. He was an
expatriate in Mexico. Working for Beta for over
20 years.
Interviewee
7*
Former
director
146 Portuguese Internationalization director, who had worked for
the company for more than 20 years.
Previously an expatriate in Mexico, but no
longer involved with the company, so less
chance he would ‘portray a particular image’
of himself or the organization (Piekkari and
Tietze, 2016, p. 219).
Interviewee
8*
HR director Not recorded Portuguese He has been working for the company for over 20
years. Explained the formalization of policies
and practices observed in headquarters and the
internationalization process.
Interviewee
9*
HR senior
manager
Not recorded Portuguese She has been working for the company for over 15
years. Explained the formalization of policies
and practices observed in headquarters.
Interviewee
10*
Manufacturing
director
63 Portuguese Involved in the internationalization process and
one of those responsible for making the
agreement between Beta and Omega. He has
been working for the company for over
25 years.
Interviewee
11***
CEO
Mexico****
80 Portuguese Involved in the internationalization process and
one of the first expatriate managers when Beta
re-entered Mexico. He has been working for
the company for over 25 years.
Interviewee
12***
Production
director****
59 Portuguese Explained the internationalization process,
managerial attitude and impact previous
experiences had on the IJV. He has been
working for the company for over 20 years.
(Continued)
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Table 2. Continued
Interviewee Position
Duration
(min) Language Reason
Interviewee
13***
Mexican
worker
43 Spanish Working for the company since its agreement
with Omega. He explained the agreement and
the role of Mexican institutions on the IJV and
the impact previous experiences had on the IJV.
Interviewee
14***
Logistics
director
28 Spanish He had been working for the company since its
re-entry. Helped negotiate the agreement with
Omega.
Interviewee
15***
Logistics
coordinator****
30 Portuguese He had been working for the company for over 20
years. Discussed the company’s
internationalization process and managerial
attitude.
Interviewee
16***
Finance
director
81 Spanish He had been working for the company since its
re-entry. Helped negotiate the agreement with
Omega and discussed the impact previous
experiences had on the IJV.
Interviewee
17***
Engineering
director****
25 Portuguese He explained the internationalization process and
relationship with Omega.
Notes:
*Interview at headquarters.
**Interview conducted outside headquarters premises.
***Interview conducted in the Mexican subsidiary.
****Brazilian expatriates.
internationalization process: how it first entered
Mexico; its alliance with Alpha; the decision to
leave and re-enter Mexico; and the re-entry and its
outcomes. Most interviews were audio-recorded,
providing about 21 hours of recordings, and were
transcribed in their original language. After data
collection, three interviewees (two former direc-
tors and a director in Mexico) were re-interviewed
for factual verification. These interviews lasted ap-
proximately 60 minutes each and helped verify our
analyses.
Documentary sources included the analysis of
more than 5,000 newspaper and businessmagazine
articles, a book on the company’s history, inter-
nal communications and local websites. After lit-
tle information on Beta and Alpha was found in
the archives of Mexican newspapers from Aguas-
calientes, Monterrey andMexico City, we used the
FACTIVA research tool. Articles were found in
English, Spanish and Portuguese. Table 3 summa-
rizes the secondary data used in this research.
Secondary data was helpful in securing addi-
tional information, especially on Omega and Al-
pha. For example, on some occasions managers
disagreed on the timing of a particular event. Us-
ing secondary data to triangulate the information
was important in clarifying dates and contexts
(Stake, 1994).
Table 3. Overview of secondary data
Beta Folha de São Paulo (1949–2016) 337 articles
Revista Exame (1999–2016) 204 articles
Book 2013 1
Dissertation (2005–2016) 2
Reforma Newspaper (1980–2016) 96 articles
FACTIVA (1949–2002) 188 articles
El Economista (1991–2002) 2 articles
Forbes Mexico (1980–2016) 4 articles
Omega FACTIVA (1980–2016) 633 articles
Reforma Newspaper (1980–2016) 2,007 articles
Alpha FACTIVA (1950–2003) 1,778 articles
Reforma Newspaper (1980–2016) 195 articles
Interview proceedings were saved on a computer
file for content analysis. Although there is already
a body of literature on the drivers of re-entry, we
opted to conduct a qualitative content analysis
for three reasons. First, our study covers a lengthy
period of time with several interactions and dif-
ferent factors (Krippendorff, 2019). Second, we
wanted to focus on the latent meaning of the data
(Schreier, 2012). Finally, we wanted not only to
understand the drivers and outcomes of re-entry
but also the learning outcomes from the process
since they are still not clear in extant literature.
To link the re-entry process to learning, we anal-
ysed data in different stages. We first selected the
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 4. Content analysis on re-entry process
First-order categories Second-order
categories
Final categories
Licensing agreement
Internal factors
Phase I - From the partnership with Alpha to
leaving the Mexican market
Technology transfer
Internalization
Judicial system
External factorsPolitical connections
Local partner
Mistrust Internal factors
Phase II – Time-out and internal and external
influences on Beta’s decision to re-enter Mexico
Institutional voids
External factors
Similar institutions
Local market
Local opportunity
Culture
Ethnocentric mindset
Internal factors
Phase III – Re-entering the Mexican market
Managers
Logistic
PKD
Innovation
Local funding
External factorsLocal workforce
Local distribution
Complementary resources: after sales, technology,
distribution, product, internal funding Internal factors
Phase IV – Internal and external influences and
the change in the re-entry process
Due diligence
Lack of funding
External factors
Competitors
material relevant to answer our research questions
and reduced the amount of data (Schreier, 2012).7
Secondary data were then used to check the infor-
mation onOmega andAlpha. Following Schreier’s
(2012) advice, in the next stage we separated the
data into two topics: (1) drivers and influences on
the re-entry process and (2) learning from the re-
entry process. Conducting a separate content anal-
ysis for each of those two topics allowed us to
initially focus on the re-entry drivers and influ-
ences and then use the data on learning from the
process.
In the analysis of the data on drivers and the
influence of the re-entry process, we used the ex-
isting literature on re-entry as a starting point. We
identified in the literature the following keywords:
managerial decision-making, network, resources,
technology and product as internal factors; pol-
itics, economy, culture, competitors, market,
infrastructure, distributions, financial agencies,
regulations and institutions as external factors.
We focused on verbal answers to the keywords
identified in the literature review and associated
their meanings in clusters (Krippendorff, 2019).
Using extant literature as guidance on internal
and external influences while focusing on the
latent meaning helped to include words we found
relevant, such as ethnocentrism, political connec-
tions, governance and trust. Interestingly, different
internal and external keywords were referred to
different phases the company went through in
Mexico, allowing us to identify four specific
phases that Beta underwent in Mexico. Table 4
summarizes the content analysis on the drivers of
re-entry.
After analysing the first topic and identifying
Beta’s fourMexican phases, we then analysed what
Beta had learned from its re-entry process. As
noted by Schreier (2012, p. 87), data-driven cod-
ing is ‘rare’ as the research question plays a role in
framing the coding. There is, however, some liter-
ature linking learning to its impact on the re-entry
process. As suggested by Krippendorff (2019), we
grouped the themes to conceptualize the learn-
ing process over time, focusing on the occurrences,
what was learned and the outcomes to the com-
7Irrelevant material was classified as that referring to pe-
riods later than 2001 and to subsidiaries other than the
ones we were analysing.
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Figure 2. Grouping of the learning and outcomes
pany. We were then able to link what managers
learned and their actions from the learning to
each of Beta’s four phases.8 Figure 2 illustrates the
grouping process.
Excerpts from the interviews were then trans-
lated into English and back-translation was con-
ducted by two other researchers to verify transla-
tion consistency (Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997).
The findings were presented to two managers in
Brazil in April 2018, who provided feedback. Ex-
amples of phrases used in the analysis are shown
in Table 5.
Findings
In this section, we describe the four phases identi-
fied in our analysis and the main events as shown
in Figure 3.
Phase I: From the partnership with Alpha to
leaving the Mexican market
The first time Beta entered Mexico, it was initi-
ated by a customer and no formal risk analysis was
conducted. The idea was to export complete bus
8Aiming for consistency and reliability, the same re-
searcher coded the material twice (Krippendorff, 2019).
No variation was found.
units (CBUs) from Brazil to Mexico. Beta agreed
that Alphawould assemble its buses inMexico and
sell them in the local market. In the early 1990s,
Beta had virtually no international experience with
other entry modes other than exporting, and part-
nering with Alpha was its first licensing agreement.
Three years after the start of the licensing agree-
ment and after 6,000 buses had been sold, Beta dis-
covered that Alpha was using Beta’s technology to
produce bus bodies that it sold in markets outside
of the agreement. Said a former Brazilian director:
They thought they could build buses using our tech-
nology without our consent. They started selling our
products behind the scenes.We had no idea they were
doing that. You don’t do that in a partnership! […]
When something like this happens in a partnership,
the only thing you can do is (terminate the contract).
The Brazilian managers were concerned about
the local owner, a public figure with important po-
litical connections. ‘The owner had a very strong
relationship with the government. The guy was
cheating. He claimed he ruled the roost’, claimed
one interviewee. Beta had difficulty finding lawyers
that could help them with the case. ‘In those coun-
tries, the law is very weak. Besides, it is difficult to
find a lawyer that can give support to a foreigner’,
said a Brazilian director. Thus, Beta decided to exit
the Mexican market.
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Table 5. Conceptualization
If you do not have laws to protect you, so you have to find ways to protect your product
In those countries, the law is very weak. Besides, it is difficult to find a lawyer that can give
support to a foreigner.
Judicial system
You have to be innovative in your technology but you also need to fit it in internally to avoid
companies copying your product.
Internalization
We did not know how to do an agreement. Licensing agreement
We had this Mexican trauma: Should we go solo or trust a partnership? Mistrust
It is easier to go to developing countries. We share the same realities from a business point of view.
It is a lack of infrastructure, populous cities, traffic jams, and poor public transportation.
Institutional voids
We had to go to banks and ask for money since customers expect funding. It is extremely expensive
to buy a bus.
Local funding
We had this ethnocentric approach; we believed our mindset to be the best. We sent key people to
replicate our operations.
Ethnocentric
mindset
The PKD logistic is difficult. The time you need for exporting and having the product in Mexico
was too long.
Beta’s product is customized and therefore, the distribution channel, although key to the industry,
was lacking in Mexico. If you do not have a proper distribution channel, you cannot meet the
demand.
Logistic
The entry of our competitor was a poke in the eye; they broke us. How to get out of this? And we
had that factory purchase promised.
Competitors
When you do the due diligence and analyze the local company, sometimes you find they issue
receipts with half of the product’s value. They may evade taxes. We are a listed company, we do
not do it.
Due diligence
Since Omega had a sales network, funding, and an industrial facility, there were many advantages
for us to form a partnership with them.
Complementary
resources
Phase II Phase III Phase IV
1991 1997 1999 2000
Entry –
Partnership 
with Alpha
Exit Mexican 
market
Re-entry -
Brownfield in 
Mexico
Main Brazilian 
competitor 
enters Mexico
Entry mode 
change – IJV 
with Omega
2001
Time out
Phase I
Figure 3. Timeline of events and phases of analysis
Due to its lack of international experience, Beta
had not foreseen the challenges linked to technol-
ogy transfers. This disappointing experience made
Beta’s managers aware of the potential pitfalls in
technology transfers, and policy changes were in-
troduced at head office. First, the company verti-
calized and internalized the production process in
order to minimize the risk (and consequences) of
being copied. ‘You have to be innovative in your
technology but you also need to fit it in internally
to avoid companies copying your product’, said a
former director. Second, it decided not to transfer
technology in future ventures to avoid poaching.
Finally, it invested in patents to protect its intellec-
tual property.
Phase II: Time out and internal/external influences
on Beta’s decision to re-enter Mexico
The Mexican market had been receptive to Beta’s
products. According to Alpha’s reports, the buses
produced by the alliance were the ‘kings of the
road’. There was demand for buses in Mexico and
a significant market for Beta’s products because
of price, quality and performance. The Brazilian
managers pointed out that the similarities (culture,
religion, language,9 weak unions and lax labour
laws) between Brazil and Mexico were appealing
9Although Spanish andPortuguese are distinct languages,
managers referred to their similarities as a positive aspect.
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to them. Said one director on the ease of transfer-
ring to another emerging economy:
It is easier to go to developing countries. We share
the same realities from a business point of view. It is
a lack of infrastructure, populous cities, traffic jams,
and poor public transportation.
However, the managers mistrusted Mexican in-
stitutions and now also Mexican partners. One
Brazilian director said, ‘We had this Mexican
trauma: Should we go solo or trust a partner-
ship?’ Beta decided then to re-enter Mexico solo
as it believed in the local receptiveness to its prod-
uct; the connections with customers (the company
counted on threemain clients already familiar with
Beta from the alliance withAlpha); and themarket
knowledge they had accumulated over the years in
partnership with Alpha. Said one:
We could re-enter the Mexican market because we
had learned from our failed experience with our pre-
vious Mexican partner. When we first enter a mar-
ket, we need someone. After a period of time, I learn
more about the market, so we no longer need them.
The Beta managers were confident they could
count on customers and managers’ understand-
ing of the institutional environment and had time
to learn more about Mexican institutions. ‘We
felt confident that we could replicate the Brazilian
model in Mexico (an operation verticalized with
multiple chassis brands)’, said a director. Another
director mentioned:
We went back to believing we had the management
skills to replicate the Brazilian model. We went back
toMexico under the logic of ‘if we know how to pro-
duce buses, we can easily sell them.’We were not con-
cerned about the market itself.
Beta re-enteredMexico through a brownfield ar-
rangement by acquiring a bankrupt automobile
company, demonstrating that managers thought
they had the know-how to re-enter solo. The au-
tomobile company owner offered two buildings to
Beta, which decided to buy one and sign a letter of
intent for the other, the plan being to have a factory
up and running within 8 months.
Phase III: Re-entering the Mexican market
Shortly after re-entry, Beta’s managers faced in-
ternal and external challenges they had not fore-
seen. Internally, the company operated on an eth-
nocentric approach: ‘[W]e had this ethnocentric
approach; we believed our mindset to be the best.
We sent key people to replicate our operations’,
said a director.
The internalization of production impacted lo-
gistics and lead-time, delays that Beta did not
foresee. Beta then developed a new system called
partial-knock-down (PKD). Under this system,
almost-complete bus bodies were exported from
Brazil to Mexico. The integration of the bus body
with the chassis was done locally in Mexico and
only minor final adjustments were needed. This in-
novation allowed Beta to provide vehicles to its
customers within a tight timetable, since it could
accelerate the assembly process: ‘The PKD logis-
tic is difficult. The time you need for exporting and
having the product in Mexico was too long’, said
a former Brazilian director. Beta realized it also
lacked a local distribution channel and after-sales
assistance, yet after-sales service was perceived as
being essential and it was difficult to sell buses in
Mexico without it. ‘It is important to have a ban-
ner, someone the customer can count on’, said a
director.
Externally, there was a lack of funding agen-
cies in Mexico. Unlike Brazil, where the govern-
ment funds mass transport, in Mexico neither the
government nor the banks underwrite the industry.
Customers had to pay for Beta’s products upfront
because the company did not have a financial insti-
tution or partner to back it. ‘We had to go to banks
and ask for money since customers expect fund-
ing. It is extremely expensive to buy a bus’, said a
Brazilian director. Another director added:
The major problem in developing countries is that
there is no credit […] If companies or individuals
don’t have lines of credit, they cannot buy a bus. If
you do not have access to credit, you cannot operate
in the market. We do not give credit. We are not a
funding agency.
In addition, the local workforce did not have
the necessary skills to work on Beta’s processes.
Beta’s products involved a high level of customiza-
tion and high labour intensity. In addition, Beta
needed to have workers with skills to build the bus
body in different chassis. The workforce in central
Mexico, where Beta re-entered the country, is not
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as highly skilled as that in northern Mexico.10 To
build a competent pool of employees that adapted
to the company’s practices, ‘production rhythm’
and quality standards took longer than expected.
A director claimed:
In the beginning, you need time to align everybody
in the same system. They knew how to do things but
the reference they had for quality was not the same
as ours.
Beta underestimated the institutional challenges
in Mexico as their managers were confident that
Brazilian and Mexican idiosyncrasies were very
similar. Beta was not prepared to face the differ-
ent institutional environment and did not possess
the expertise and skills needed to go solo in a de-
manding context such a Mexico. Another director
added:
Wewere a company from the countryside, a company
that is embedded in the south of Brazil where noth-
ing happens. I would say it is a Brazilian aspect; we
were closed to FDI, and we lacked qualified man-
agers or managers with an open mind about the ad-
versities we could face when doing business abroad.
We were used to Brazilian adversities but in a foreign
country the problems are different.
They realized they had not learned the lessons
from the failed experience.
The company had been struggling inMexico for
18 months after re-entry when its primary com-
petitor from Brazil followed suit in international-
ization and bought the building for which Beta had
signed a letter of intent. The competitor rapidly
gained market share. Remarked a former Brazilian
director:
The entry of our competitor was a poke in the eye.
They broke us. Now we needed to find out how to
get out of this? And we had that factory purchase
promised.
The entrance of Beta’s primary competitor was
a severe blow to a company already struggling af-
ter re-entering Mexico and reinforced the lack of
trust, since Beta had signed a letter of intent to
purchase the building.
10For instance, whereas the daily minimumwage in north-
ern Mexico is $Mex176.72, in the rest of the country it is
$Mex102.68 (El Sol de México, 2019).
Phase IV: Internal and external influences and the
change in the re-entry process
To prevent its competitor from gaining further
market share, the managers decided to search for
partners to bolster areas in which they were strug-
gling. Initially, they considered partnering with lo-
cal companies. However, after exercising due dili-
gence on two Mexican companies, they decided
they would again be at risk. A Brazilian director
mentioned:
When you do the due diligence and analyze the local
company, sometimes you find they issue receipts with
half of the product’s value. Theymay evade taxes.We
are a listed company, we do not do it.
Added another director: ‘If a company does not
have compliance, we cannot (partner with them)’.
Local companies’ lack of compliance increased
Beta’s lack of trust inMexican legislation on prop-
erty rights. Added to the failed experience with Al-
pha, Beta decided not to partner with locals.
At this point, Beta’s clients played a significant
role. Three of Beta’s main Mexican customers
requested Omega chassis when purchasing the
Beta bus body. Omega was interested in increasing
its share of the chassis market in Mexico and,
knowing Beta’s struggles, identified an oppor-
tunity. Omega would benefit from co-operation
as Beta offered a wide range of products for
which Omega could supply its chassis. The head
of the Omega bus division saw the IJV as an
opportunity to offer a wider range of buses to the
Mexican market,11 while the senior vice-president
referred to the IJV as an opportunity to further
expand Omega’s global position.12 For its part,
Beta needed complementary resources that were
internally lacking to cope with the local challenges
they were facing. Omega could offer Beta an es-
tablished distribution system and access to reliable
after-sales service it had built up inMexico. More-
over, Omega had 50% of the chassis market in
Mexico and its own bank based in Germany that
could fundmass transport companies interested in
buying buses, meaning Beta’s customers inMexico
would have access to Omega’s financial services.
Said a Brazilian director: ‘Since Omega had a sales
network, funding and an industrial facility, there
were many advantages for us to form a partnership
11(EFE News, 2000).
12(Dow Jones International News, 2000).
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with them’. Added another: ‘We could use their
selling structure and network. We did not need to
increase our cost to develop a network ourselves
and we optimized resources to be more competi-
tive’. Omega’s other positive attributes included its
reputation, a strong global presence and a focus
on the car industry rather than buses.13 Omega
also provided the IJV with compliance procedures
such as quality systems and the SAP system,
which helped to deal with local requirements such
as fiscal and quality procedures. Those corporate
governance procedures helped Beta develop con-
trol mechanisms and increase trust in the Mexican
experience among managers and shareholders.
Omega bought 26% of Beta’s Mexican opera-
tion, creating an IJV that saved Beta from having
to either incur the risks involved with investing
heavily or exiting for the second time. Throughout
the negotiating process, Omega demanded that
Beta sign 13 separate contracts specifying the
IJV terms as well as the after-sales assistance,
distribution and funding terms. ‘They asked us to
sign contracts for technical assistance. I had never
experienced that. It seemed they didn’t trust us’,
said a Brazilian manager who was on the IJV ne-
gotiating team. The alliance was established for a
period of 7 years. The IJV board comprised seven
directors, four of whom were Brazilian (Beta’s
CEO and its director for global business and the
IJV’s CEO and production director), two German
(Omega’s CEO for buses and its director for buses
in Mexico) and one Mexican (the IJV’s commer-
cial director). The strategy proved successful. In
subsequent years, Beta’s Brazilian competitor
went bankrupt and Beta’s market share expanded
and currently ranks second in Mexico, which now
represents the company’s second largest market.
The unsuccessful solo experience led managers
to reflect on the re-entry process. A director ex-
plained:
It took time for us to learn. In the beginning, we were
haughty […]Wewere overconfidentwe could go solo.
We learned through the internationalization process
and went backwards. We had to sit and reflect on
what we did wrong.
13An Omega bus body in Mexico would cost 2.5 times
more than Beta’s. Omega knew it could not gain the bus
body market due to its price. Therefore, the company did
not transfer its bus body technology into Mexico.
Further, they learned the importance of risk
analysis. Managers created a risk committee with
the help of the big four accounting firms to help
them deal with local legislation, prospect newmar-
kets and assess institutional factors (legislation,
workforce, nationalization standards, local con-
tent, taxation and funding availability) and the
business culture specific to the country (avail-
able resources, logistics, infrastructure, price, qual-
ity and product adaptation). A former director
claimed:
We learned that we need to have a deep understand-
ing of the market. It is not only picking up a folder
and saying ‘I will analyze the market and do business
there.’ It does not work that way.
The outcome led head office to change Beta’s
internationalization strategy and enter other mar-
kets through IJVs with chassis companies, focus-
ing on their internal capabilities. A former director
said:
We had to change our concept. We have technology,
production, and logistics. We do not have market,
branding, funding, local distribution, and HR. Bus
companies in most cases depend on government con-
cessions; and they need local funding. Those are the
reasons we need a local partner.
Consequently, Beta entered six other countries
through IJVs. Table 6 summarizes the main drivers
and outcomes of the four phases.
Discussion and implications
This studywasmotivated by the limited knowledge
about companies’ re-entry into foreign markets.
The case addressed several inter-related questions
regarding the re-entry of a Brazilian company
into a market characterized by institutional voids.
As evidenced by this study, experience amassed
through failure does not assure success upon
re-entry.
Beta’s decision to exit Mexico was triggered
by opportunistic technology appropriation by
a local partner and the lack of support from
local institutions on protection of their property
rights, generating Brazilian managers’ mistrust of
Mexican companies and institutions. The re-entry
process was shaped by managers’ perceptions
that they had a product that was appropri-
ate for the Mexican market and had acquired
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Table 6. Main drivers and outcomes of the four phases
Actions Drivers Outcomes
Entry Opportunity to expand into a new market; expertise
in dealing with institutional voids; initiated by a
third company.
Mexico was (initially) Beta’s most successful
international market. However, the partnership
suffered when Alpha produced other products
under Beta’s technology.
Exit Breach of trust by the partner and local institutions;
property rights issues.
Brazilian managers decided to internalize the
production; no longer transfer their technology to
other companies; and to develop patents.
Re-entry Opportunity to expand the market; similar market
demands; part of NAFTA; skilled workforce;
because Brazil and Mexico were perceived as
displaying close cultural and institutional
distances (institutional challenges were
underestimated), there was (over)confidence about
Brazilian managers’ local know-how and expertise
about the Mexican market (myopic learning).
Managers realized they were not prepared to enter
the Mexican market solo (also failed to do a
proper risk analysis) after failing to get access to
funding, distribution problems and lack of
after-sales assistance. They also recognized they
had not understood the local market as well as
previously thought (reappraisal).
Change of mode
on re-entry
Lack of established logistics system; lack of local
funding sources; excess of confidence about
managers’ know-how; lack of intermediaries;
difficulties in finding local suppliers; institutional
voids not protecting the company; entry of a direct
competitor from Brazil (exploration of another
alternative).
Beta decided to change its entry mode and ally with a
company from a developed economy. The
headquarters developed a risk analysis, decided to
put in place a formal internationalization strategy
and decided its internationalization process should
occur through alliances in which the local partner
had the knowledge needed to operate in the
market.
sufficient knowledge to be successful in their sec-
ond attempt. Managers were confident they could
replicate their Brazilian success and had learned
from prior failure: that they were equipped to
operate in a developing economy; that they knew
the idiosyncrasies of the Mexican market, net-
works, suppliers and customers; and that they
had amassed the necessary knowledge to re-enter
the Mexican market solo. However, Beta did
not have a clear internationalization strategy,
lacked careful risk analysis and consequently
had no structured market selection process. This
reflected Beta’s ethnocentric approach that over-
looked the impact of external factors such as
the local skills, compliance regulations, access
to funding and distribution intermediaries. The
unfolding events demonstrated that managers
did not possess the knowledge they believed they
had.
The external factors encountered in Mexico, as
well as the entry of its main Brazilian competi-
tor into the market, forced Beta to admit its mis-
takes and change its re-entry mode to create an al-
liance with a partner. The overconfidence observed
in the re-entry was the result of hasty conclusions.
Its narrow focus on protecting property rights af-
ter the failure of the first entry may have prevented
it from taking a broader outlook when develop-
ing a re-entry strategy.14 The solution eventually
was to enter into an IJV with a foreign company
with complementary resources and a global rep-
utation, compliance and governance procedures,
and an all-important credit financing division.
Beta, therefore, benefitted from the partnership
with Omega as the German company brought re-
sources that Beta was lacking, plugging its insti-
tutional gaps. In addition, Beta benefitted from
Omega’s reputation and legitimacy in theMexican
market. Local companies could not provide the in-
ternal resources Beta was lacking nor cover the in-
stitutional gaps.
Theoretical implications
This study adds to the growing business discussion
on internationalization dynamics (Benito, Petersen
and Welch, 2012; Surdu, Mellahi and Glaister,
2019; Vissak and Zhang, 2015). Specifically, it fo-
cuses on foreign market re-entry and proposes that
the presence of trusted institutions and manage-
rial perceptions on learning are important factors
in shaping firm actions. As such, our first theoret-
ical contribution is on the process of making and
14We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this
insight.
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implementing re-entry decisions. Given that this is
a largely unexplored topic, it is important to estab-
lish whether decisions are effective and the extent
to which learning may contribute to the success
of re-entry efforts. While this study reveals that
experiences do not readily translate to effective
learning, it does nonetheless illustrate the iterative,
learning-by-doing nature of such processes.
Our second contribution is the insights into in-
stitutional influences on MNEs’ foreign-market
decisions. Extant literature has typically high-
lighted the advantages of partnering with local
companies for their local knowledge, connections
(Shi, Sun and Peng, 2012) and access to criti-
cal resources (Welch, Benito and Petersen, 2018).
Hence, it has repeatedly been noted that in coun-
tries with high institutional risk, companies should
opt for local partners (Beamish andLupton, 2009).
This study, however, provides a counter-case in
which two foreign companies – one Brazilian and
one German – formed a successful IJV in a third
country. Omega brought to the venture what Beta
lacked (such as funding, after-sales service and lo-
gistics) and what the local market was not able
to provide. Omega also had compliance and gov-
ernance and could perform institutional roles for
funding and infrastructure (Cumming et al., 2017;
Ellis et al., 2017). In this industry, funding and dis-
tribution are key resources that Beta lacked and
that did not exist in the marketplace. Beta, there-
fore, benefitted fromOmega’s resources and was in
a better position to deal with local institutional de-
mands. In addition, Beta benefitted from the posi-
tive reputation Omega had in the market as a com-
pany from an advanced economy.15
Our results suggest that to overcome institu-
tional voids such as inefficient regulations and
lack of intermediaries and credit, companies
should consider partnering with a well-established
company from an advanced country that possesses
resources lacking in an emerging economy, has
compliance and governance procedures, and is
well established in the global market. In Beta’s
case, the required critical resources were clearly
not reliably available from local companies. Extant
literature suggests that, in emerging economies,
partnering with a local company can help cir-
cumvent institutional voids (Inkpen and Beamish,
15Of course, Omega also benefitted from the partnership
as it was able to expand its market offerings and global
presence.
1997). While this may be true in sectors where
connections with local authorities and networks
might be prerequisites,16 in our case the local com-
pany’s (Alpha) government connections worked
against Beta. As well, other local companies
lacked the funding, distribution and after-sales
service Beta needed and were perceived as demon-
strating opportunistic behaviour facilitated by a
lack of regulations. Partnering with a reputable
company from a developed economy reduced
the perceived risks of technology appropriation.
Indeed, the partnering company itself had more
sophisticated technology available in Europe and,
being foreign, was not tempted to pursue short-
term local gains. This finding is consistent with
the argument that domestic firms in developing
countries prefer operating in environments with
loose intellectual property protection standards
as that allows them to imitate the products and
processes of competitors (Brandl, Darendeli and
Mudambi, 2019). Omega’s assets and reputation
created an atmosphere that inspired Beta’s trust
and removed its fear of being trapped in a foreign
market as it had been earlier by a local partner.
Our third contribution is a perspective on how
the stock of knowledge accumulated from previ-
ous experiences may hamper re-entry. Extant lit-
erature has highlighted previous local knowledge
as a factor that fosters re-entry by averting sunk
costs and the loss of previously established net-
works. This argument is also linked to the learning-
from-failure literature that discusses how compa-
nies progress from failure and use the knowledge
gained to explore new alternatives that increase the
probability of success (Madsen and Desai, 2010).
Here, we propose that knowledge accumulated
from experiences/failures and the way alternatives
are explored based on learning-from-failure may
spur a company’s re-entry, but also instil unwar-
ranted confidence that it has the resources, stock of
knowledge and expertise for successful re-entry. In
discussing the success trap, Levinthal and March
(1993) argue that confidence from past successes
cannot be fully applied to future operations. Our
study suggests that managers’ overconfidence can
stem froma belief that they have learned from their
previous failures/errors and are prepared to suc-
cessfully re-enter the market.
16We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this in-
sight.
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While much research supports the view that fail-
ure leads to learning (Madsen and Desai, 2010;
Tan and Sousa, 2019), our study suggests that
this is not always the case. This is in line with
Meschi and Métais’s (2015) findings on acquisi-
tions that failures do not always contribute posi-
tively to a learning process but may instead lead
to misinterpretations of crucial aspects of a fail-
ure. The empirical evidence suggests that Beta’s
managers overestimated the learning from its ex-
periences and the stock of knowledge accumulated
from the failure. In addition, Brazilian managers
were confident about their success in the Mexican
market. In so doing, Beta focused on the main rea-
son for its entry failure and underestimated other
aspects, resulting in erroneous decisions and lim-
ited learning. Tsang (2002) also identified the exis-
tence of learning myopia in IJVs by showing that
firms focus on how important the JV is rather than
how much a firm wants to learn from the over-
all IJV experience. This is illustrated in our study
as managers ignored information about the local
context and the possibility of competitors entering
the market. Instead, the narrow focus and man-
agerial confidence gained by addressing the fail-
ure had not prepared the company for a second at-
tempt. Managers’ perceptions of their experiences
served as competence traps, led to overconfidence
(Levinthal and March, 1993) and prevented them
from having a full grasp of the re-entry process.
The failure to learn from previous experiences can
also be linked to the often traumatic experience
of these events that can provoke negative emo-
tions and are likely to hamper learning (Shepherd,
Covin and Kuratko, 2009; Yamakawa, Peng and
Deeds, 2015). Referring to it as the ‘Mexican
trauma’, managers may inadvertently have created
obstacles for learning through the mere collec-
tion and processing of failure-related information,
forcing managers to concentrate on the reason for
failure rather than viewing the process holistically.
Managers displayed overconfidence in their
knowledge and underestimated the differences
they were facing in Mexico, leading to a lack of
motivation to acquire new knowledge and result-
ing in erroneous decisions and limited learning.
Even with a previous failure experience, managers
were unable to sufficiently adjust the actions of
the company due to a persistent overconfidence
in the company and in its learning. In addition,
managers may mislead the focus of their attention
on what they perceived to be the main reasons for
their failure (e.g. the intellectual property aspect)
by redirecting their efforts on preventing them-
selves from making the same mistakes, instead of
having an integrative vista in developingmarket re-
entry strategies.17 We call this phenomenon inter-
national knowledge myopia.
Managerial implications
This study provides useful insights for managers.
Firstly, managers need to be aware of the phe-
nomenon of international knowledge myopia that
we have described. Knowledge and internation-
alization experience influence the company’s re-
entry process but may encourage unwarranted
overconfidence that could ultimately lead to fail-
ure. Past experiences do not assure learning and
knowledge and must not be overestimated.
Secondly, when a company re-enters a market
with high institutional risk, local partners are not
necessarily the best choice. Local companies may
take advantage of the foreign company (e.g. in-
tellectual property theft) because local institutions
provide weak safeguards. This is consistent with
findings in extant literature that indicate there is an
increase in opportunistic behaviour (Luo, 2007a,
2007b) when the rule of law is weak. As such, the
advantages of local knowledge, connections and
access to critical resources become less important
than the benefits of having a dependable partner.
Conclusion
This study examines the under-explored phe-
nomenon of re-entry into foreign markets. It uses
an in-depth case study to describe and analyse
the re-entry process and thus creates a better
understanding of the phenomenon and provides
a platform for improved conceptualization of
determinants and processes. We suggest that fu-
ture research should assess re-entry processes in
other countries and regions, preferably using case
studies to further explore the dynamics of the
re-entry decision. While longitudinal, our study
is retrospective. Ideally, future work should also
attempt to cover the whole duration of re-entry
processes, examining them as they unfold. Al-
though Beta is a multinational enterprise, it is
17We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this
insight.
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a family-owned business. Considering that past
studies have linked learning, ownership and corpo-
rate governance (e.g. Aguilera andCrespi-Cladera,
2016; Filatotchev et al., 2003), further research
is encouraged into the link between international
knowledge myopia and ownership. Finally, future
research may also explore other institutional influ-
ences on re-entry and the reasons why companies
change re-entry strategies over time.
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